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Introduction
Scholars have long explored the legal and institutional continuities that inhere in the
transition from the era of late empire to the rise of nation-states, underscoring how
external rule produced particular trajectories of Arab state formation.1 Extensive
violence in Iraq and Syria today has directed much of that attention to the influence
of British and French mandatory rule on the emergence of nation-states in the region.2
One striking feature of this transition was the rhetoric of self-determination and
purportedly time-limited, developmental intervention that the mandatory powers used
to extend control over local populations after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.
In asserting a role as protector of nations emerging from the postwar partitions, the
League of Nations helped neutralize local struggles for independence.3
The conceptual framework of “transformative occupation” in the modern Middle
East illuminates the techniques of foreign rule within these wider imperial histories
while linking them to ambitious programs of development.4 Whether in the name of
civilization or modernity, whether by a colonial or mandated power, imposing the
practices of Western governance on “backward” peoples and space characterized trans-
formative occupation regimes.5 In this essay, I examine how a particular practice
within the political and diplomatic repertoire of transformative occupation—the
promotion of local autonomy—was successfully deployed in the Israeli-Palestinian
arena. Autonomy had long been used as a technique of foreign indirect control across
the British Empire, from the Princely States of India to West Africa under High
Commissioner Frederick Lugard.6 The context of Israel’s post-1967 rule over the terri-
tories—which began well after the end of empire, the mandates, and the major waves
of decolonization—can shed new light on the relationship between late twentieth-
century occupation and the persistence of prolonged statelessness. Echoing the invo-
cation of limited self-rule over fifty years earlier, Israel proffered autonomy as a
benevolent solution to the Palestinian question in American-led negotiations with
Egypt beginning in the late 1970s. Simultaneously expanding control over the
Occupied Territories, Israeli leaders transformed both the political subjects under their
rule and the physical ground they inhabited.
For many Israelis and their supporters abroad, the capture of the Sinai Peninsula,
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and all of Jerusalem in June of 1967 was
greeted with ecstatic revelry, seeming to fulfill the redemptive hopes of messianic
Zionism.7 At the same time, the expansion of Israel’s territory raised profound political
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and demographic questions for Israeli leaders.8 During cabinet discussions about the
future of the newly occupied territories in the weeks after the war, the issue of how to
manage the Palestinian population took on central importance. A “decision not to
decide,” as the Israeli historian Avi Raz explains, ensured control over the territories
themselves while avoiding a political resolution to the national or territorial fate of the
Palestinians.9
Israel’s deliberate indecision was met with external pressure to address the status
of both the territories and their inhabitants. Influenced by the broader sweep of decol-
onization in the global south and the aftermath of the Vietnam War, a small number
of American officials began to recognize the necessity of limited Palestinian rights by
the late 1970s.10 The election of Jimmy Carter as U.S. president in 1976 helped cement
this paradigm shift. Carter saw the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians as the
heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he downplayed the hitherto dominant interpre-
tation based on interstate tensions between Israel and rivals like Jordan and Syria. The
president and his advisors believed that this issue had to be tackled head on, speaking
openly of the need for a Palestinian “homeland” for the first time in March 1977.11
This approach fit within a wider attempt to position the United States as an arbiter
of human rights on a global stage.12 In applying this framework abroad, the Carter
administration’s record often fell short of its rhetorical aims, particularly in the Middle
East.13 Nevertheless, the success of the Camp David Accords in September 1978 stands
out as a leading example of America’s renewed diplomatic promise. After thirteen days
of secret negotiations between Carter, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, and
Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat at the rural Maryland retreat of Camp David, the
outline of an Egyptian-Israeli peace deal was reached.14
Camp David’s less well known agreement, A Framework for Peace in the Middle
East, contained guidelines to establish Palestinian autonomy and a set of principles
that would govern Israel’s relations with all its Arab neighbors. The agreement
included specific language to “recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people
and their just requirements.”15 In brief remarks before the official signing of the
Accords, Carter reiterated the importance of Palestinian self-determination, reminding
his audience “of the hopes and dreams of the people who live in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.” Exactly what this meant in political or territorial terms was left inten-
tionally vague, its precision limited to forcing the parties to decide on a process
guaranteeing full autonomy for Palestinians within a period of five years.16 This
temporally circumscribed period during which Palestinians might earn greater legit-
imacy harkened back to the temporalities of the mandate era, when external rule was
invoked as a necessary means for civilizing a native population seeking self-
governance.17
Following Camp David, the ensuing diplomatic effort to address the Palestinian
question began with the launch of negotiations over autonomy in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. These talks, convened by Egypt and Israel under U. S. supervision, were
held intermittently in the Middle East and Washington, D.C., between May 1979 and
August 1982. Although from their inception they excluded representatives of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and local Palestinians—Egypt purported to
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represent them, acceding to Israeli pressure on the format of negotiations, while Pales-
tinians and several Arab states opposed negotiations altogether—the talks were the
first sustained political consideration of Palestinian self-determination after 1948.
Despite their significance, the autonomy talks are largely absent from historical
accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.18 Among the leading studies, the Israeli
historian Benny Morris dismisses autonomy as a “nonstarter,” while other scholars
downplay or ignore the negotiations in the wake of Camp David.19 Dominant narra-
tives of the peace process instead trace the beginning of a serious engagement with the
Palestinian question to the Madrid and Oslo negotiation of the 1990s.20 This lack of
serious attention to the diplomatic mechanisms that constrained Palestinian self-
determination in the 1970s and 1980s obscures the centrality of that period to the
contemporary condition of statelessness.
Those who do examine this earlier period, like one recent study of the Carter
administration’s approach, paint a more sympathetic portrait of American attempts to
create a process leading to “genuine Palestinian self-determination” by challenging the
Begin government on settlement expansion and territorial withdrawal.21 But as I will
suggest here, the U.S. role in the autonomy talks—and the very substance of the
negotiations themselves—actively undermined the prospects of a solution to the Pales-
tinian question. In reassessing Camp David’s aftermath using newly released archival
sources that illuminate these pivotal discussions around the Palestinian question,
autonomy’s conceptual and political salience complicates the notion of Carter’s
summit as “heroic diplomacy.”22 For the Palestinians, it proved a crucial moment of
disenfranchisement.
Autonomy, as a political, diplomatic, and conceptual instrument of transformative
occupation, became the ground upon which Israel cemented indefinite control over
the Occupied Territories without any expiry date or formal annexation. During the
talks, American and Egyptian officials adopted an Israeli version of limited autonomy
as a solution to the Palestinian question. This approach stressed the concept of indi-
vidual rights for “Arab inhabitants” of the Occupied Territories while precluding
territorial control or the possibility of statehood.23 In proffering autonomy as an alter-
native to self-rule, Israeli diplomats sought to mitigate criticism of the occupation
while simultaneously extending Israeli state sovereignty beyond the 1967 borders.
Combined with a marked increase in settlement construction, the successive rounds
of negotiations effectively solidified Israeli control in the territories and blurred the
demarcation of a border, helping prevent Palestinian state formation in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.24
After first examining the conceptual lineage of autonomy and its promotion by
Israel’s Likud government in the late 1970s, I explore the trajectory of the autonomy
talks in their formative early months. Hamstrung by divergent aims and structural
disparities, the talks collapsed, after more than three years of meetings, during Israel’s
1982 war in Lebanon. Yet their process and their failure alike illuminate the contours
of Israeli and American diplomacy toward the Palestinian question. Autonomy, as
later rounds of peace negotiations would reveal, became the dominant framework for
discussions of Palestinian self-determination. Israel’s selective invocation of a seem-
ingly benevolent attitude toward the “Arab population” in the Occupied Territories,
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coupled with the broader diplomatic practice of deliberate state prevention, links post-
1948 developments with earlier patterns evident during the mandate era.
The Emergence of Palestinian Autonomy
Likud leader Menachem Begin’s 1977 election as prime minister of Israel shocked the
Labor-party dominated politics of the country.25 An heir to the revisionist founder
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Begin was a believer in the “Greater Land of Israel” ideology that
encouraged Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Seeing this territory as central to
Israeli identity, he always referred to it using the biblical names of “Judea and
Samaria.”26 After these areas were conquered in 1967, Begin was deeply opposed to
granting “Arab inhabitants” political rights or any form of territorial control that
could lead to Palestinian statehood.27 But running counter to this exclusivist line of
thinking was Begin’s more inclusive conception of nationalism, based in part on the
European model of Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini, who had elevated a
progressive version of the nation-state that should provide individual rights to minori-
ties.28
Autonomist thinking, as the historian Dimitry Shumsky emphasizes, has a rich
precedent in Jewish history, as a vehicle for a cohesive minority group to organize
itself culturally and politically, albeit with limited sovereignty. It figured prominently
in the Zionist approach to political formations in Palestine, along with statist perspec-
tives.29 Together, the influence of Jabotinsky’s “Greater Land of Israel” revisionism
and the discourse of liberal nationalist thinkers fed Begin’s emerging conception of
Palestinian Arabs as a minority rather than a self-determining political entity. This
tension engendered a shift in Begin’s thinking by the time he was elected prime
minister ten years later.
In late December 1977, having reconsidered his blanket opposition in 1967, Begin
presented his version of an autonomy plan for the inhabitants of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip to the Israeli Knesset. Begin’s plan was nonterritorial, proposing autonomy
through the election of administrative councils by “Arab inhabitants” of the territories.
These councils’ purview was to be areas like education, housing, transport, agriculture,
and health. But in distinguishing between local administrative operations and
sovereign control, security and public order would remain entrusted to Israeli author-
ities.30 Residents of these areas, regardless of existing affiliations, would be eligible for
Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. In the speech announcing his plan, Begin implored,
“We have a right and a demand for sovereignty over these areas of Eretz Yisrael [the
Land of Israel]. This is our land and it belongs to the Jewish nation rightfully.” The
prime minister opposed any engagement with the PLO, asserting, “We do not even
dream of the possibility—if we are given the chance to withdraw our military forces
from Judea, Samaria and Gaza—of abandoning those areas to the control of the
murderous organization that is called the PLO . . . This is history’s meanest murder
organization, except for the armed Nazi organizations.”31
Begin believed that his version of autonomy would provide a solution that could
bypass direct annexation and uphold liberal claims of protecting a national minority.
He defended his views in a May 1977 interview with Time magazine. “What is wrong
with a Jewish majority living together with an Arab minority in peace, in human
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dignity, in equality of rights? I believe that we can live together. It is not an occupied
country, as people understand that horrible term. We let them live in their
homeland.”32 Begin’s pretense of providing the local population with cultural and
economic autonomy drew on the old colonial discourse of limited self-determination
for native inhabitants. Simultaneously, the prime minister asserted that Israeli citizens
maintained the right to purchase land and settle in the Occupied Territories, ensuring
their transformative domination of the very same geographic space.33 The “unilateral
declarations” appended at the bottom of the original 1977 draft autonomy plan made
the limitations of such an approach very clear.
A) Under no circumstances will Israel permit the establishment in Judea, Samaria
and the Gaza District of a ‘Palestinian State.’ Such a state would be a mortal
danger to the civilian population of Israel and a grave peril to the free world.
B) After the end of the transitional period of five years Israel will claim its
inalienable rights to sovereignty in the areas of Eretz Israel: Judea, Samaria and
the Gaza District.34
These declarations, we should note, contradicted the initial, pre–Camp David
American and Egyptian conceptions of autonomy, which envisioned granting some
undetermined form of political rights to the Palestinians.
During the Camp David summit that followed in 1978, Egyptian president Anwar
al-Sadat spoke openly of resolving the Palestinian issue, while Begin and his advisors
pushed to dislodge the matter from any final Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Indeed the
pursuit of a bilateral agreement with Egypt became a diplomatic coup that neutralized
external Arab threats to Israel and also helped to avoid peacemaking with the Pales-
tinians. In his assessment of Camp David, William Quandt, a member of Carter’s
Middle East team and the leading American expert on the summit, explains that in
signing the accords, Israel secured retention of the West Bank. “For Begin, Sinai had
been sacrificed, but Eretz Israel had been won.”35
Critics of the Camp David process gradually recognized this outcome, speaking
out forcefully against Sadat’s treatment of the Palestinians. The Palestinian scholar
Edward Said argued that the Egyptian president had abandoned pan-Arab and Pales-
tinian interests by making peace with Israel and viewed the resulting autonomy
proposal as a cover for Israeli domination over Palestinians through the premise of
“continued national non-independence.”36 The PLO Executive Committee
announced its “total rejection” of the accords on September 18, 1978, and on October
1, leaders from the territories declared autonomy was an “open plot” against Pales-
tinian rights, especially self-determination.37 PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat warned that
any supporters of Sadat would “pay a high price,” later describing the autonomy idea
as “no more than managing the sewers.”38
The PLO had reason to worry about the meaning of Camp David. Some months
later, President Carter would publicly declare, “We’ve never espoused an independent
Palestinian state. I think that would be a destabilizing factor there.”39 Carter’s legal
counsel, Robert Lipshutz, questioned Sadat and other Arab leaders’ insistence on the
inviolability of Palestinian statehood. In Lipshutz’s view, “They all fully recognize that
it’s in their worst interest to see that happen. I think their public posture is in their
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judgment required for the time being because of their own inter-Arab relationships.”
In his own private assessment, Carter’s legal counsel argued that the best outcome was
a “federation of some type” with Jordan.40 It was clear that neither the Israelis nor the
Americans would support a PLO-run Palestinian state.
In this U.S.-Israeli consensus on preventing Palestinian statehood, autonomy
played a key conceptual and diplomatic role, establishing a flexible basis for transform-
ative occupation that systematically dislocated territory from population.
Diachronically it would defer Palestinian political rights, while synchronically it would
suffocate the discursive life of sovereignty claims. Along these lines, while negotiating
the final details of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979, Begin expanded
on the implications of autonomy in discussions with President Carter. “We must be
sure that no Palestinian state will emerge from the autonomy,” Begin implored. “Had
we thought that out of autonomy a Palestinian state would arise we would never have
suggested it. We will not accept a Palestinian state . . . We are speaking of autonomy,
not sovereignty, not a state.”41 The Israeli prime minister was deeply concerned that
the United States would attempt to secure territorial control for Arabs in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip by agreeing to a more expansive view of autonomy. “We are not
talking about autonomy for or to the West Bank and Gaza, but only for the inhabi-
tants. It is written so . . . If the self-governing authority provides full autonomy to the
West Bank, this means that the territory has full autonomy, and Israel will have no
right to be there. But we do have that right, because this is the land of Israel.”42
Carter recognized the incompatibility of Begin’s vision with the reality on the
ground. The land itself, in Israel’s configuration, was pivotal for Jewish settlement and
therefore separated from any autonomy arrangement. This double process of deterrito-
rialization and reterritorialization evokes the shifting forms of territorial control that
characterized Eastern Mediterranean border zones in the mandate period, never fully
resolved in the post-1948 West Bank.43 During his final effort to secure the peace
treaty with Egypt, the United States president held meetings in Cairo and Jerusalem
in March 1979. His discussion with Begin and Israel’s minister of agriculture, Ariel
Sharon, underscored his growing concern that autonomy discussions provided cover
for burgeoning settlement expansion in the Occupied Territories. Carter told Begin
and Sharon of his worry that the discussions over autonomy were advancing without
Palestinian or Jordanian participation, which signaled, “in effect, that almost in perpe-
tuity Israel can retain complete control over the West Bank area.” He added the
concern that Sharon, with Begin’s explicit support, indicated he would put “a million
Jewish settlers on the West Bank,” which would make it “impossible” for the Pales-
tinians to participate in the discussions. “I have no way of looking into your hearts
and souls and see how deeply you want to proceed with the self-government that the
Prime Minister himself proposed,” Carter told Sharon and Begin. “But something has
to be done to assure those who live on the West Bank and Gaza.”44
The Israeli prime minister responded with a robust defense of his vision for
autonomy, reinforcing the notion that it was compatible with settlement expansion
and insisting it could not lead to a state. “I believe it is one of the most beautiful,
human ideas ever proposed by Zionism and Judaism, because we were a persecuted
people and we understand another people, and we want not to interfere in their daily
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affairs.” In using this rhetoric, Begin posited the quotidian needs of local residents as
apolitical, in contrast to the more politically expansive, temporally dynamic, and
developmental needs of Israel:
What we need is security, and may I respectfully say that if my friend, the Minister
of Agriculture [Ariel] Sharon spoke about a million Jews in Judea and Samaria, he
didn’t mean any wrong, Mr. President. The number of Jews living in Judea and
Samaria is not an obstacle to the autonomy for the Arab inhabitants . . . Why
can’t Jews and Arabs live together? In Haifa they live together; in Nazareth they
live together. This is the idea: to live together. But the Arabs will have autonomy.
We will not interfere with their affairs. We want to make sure that there is security
and there is no Palestinian state.
Sharon, the architect of Israel’s settlement expansion as agriculture minister in the
Likud government, reinforced Begin’s point. Drawing on a long-standing trope that
denied Palestinian national identity, Sharon asserted that Jordan was the Palestinian
state: “We want the autonomy; we are ready to go very far, but there will never be a
second Palestinian state, and I think it is important to make it clear now, in order to
prevent misunderstanding in the future.”45
The Likud government’s response to the Palestinian struggle for self-
determination had been to launch a dramatically successful effort to settle Jews in the
territories captured in 1967. Equating the settlers with Palestinian Arabs in Israel,
Sharon asked Carter how he could prevent Jews from settling beyond the 1967
borders, given the number of Palestinian Arabs within Israel itself. “Altogether in this
part of the world, I don’t see any possibility whatsoever to draw any geographical line
which can divide between Jewish population and Arab population, because we live
here together.” Such logic of equivalence between settlers and the Palestinian citizens
of Israel suggested a retroactive justification of population exchange and the simulta-
neous denial of an interstate occupation beyond the 1967 borders. Neither did Sharon
shy away from his boastful prediction of one million Jewish settlers in the territories:
Believe me, Mr. President, when I use this figure of one million, saying that in
20–30 years I hope that one million Jews will live there, Mr. President, I can assure
you, they will live there. There’s nothing to do about it. They will live there and
if we said that we believe that in Jerusalem, what we call the Greater Jerusalem, it
is a crucial problem for us, to have one million Jews, they will live there, and they
will live in what we call the area of Gush Etzion, in Tekoah, in Maaleh Edomim.
They will live there. There is nothing to do about it. We were very careful to settle
Jews, and that is what we are doing now.46
The exchange of views during this meeting highlights how Israel successfully delin-
eated the limits of its position on Palestinian autonomy while asserting the centrality
of settlement expansion, and all in the context of United States–led negotiations over
a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.
When Carter returned to Egypt to secure Sadat’s final approval for the treaty,
Begin gave an interview with Israel Radio evening news that clearly stated his inten-
tions in the territories. “There will be no border through Eretz Israel,” Begin
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remarked. “And I think this is one of the finest concepts of Zionism and Judaism: we
want to live in peace with our neighbors in Eretz Israel.”47 It was a frank explanation
of Begin’s long-standing revisionist position on the land itself, predicated on the total
erasure of the 1967 Green Line. Israel’s occupation would both expand its borders and
serve as the definitive means to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state. Such an
approach was distinct from Begin’s benevolent rhetoric about the “Arab inhabitants”
of these territories, who he kept insisting would enjoy the autonomy arrangement.
Carter finally witnessed the signing of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in Wash-
ington on March 26, 1979. In a personal letter to the United States president several
days before the signing, the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev outlined his deep antipathy
toward the idea of a separate peace, with his most pointed criticisms concerning the
fate of the Palestinians:
Let us face the truth. All what is happening now means an actual departure from
a solution of the Palestinian problem. It was simply drowned in various political
maneuvers which may appear subtle to some but in fact are not in any way tied—
neither from political nor from humane viewpoints—to the legitimate demands
of the Arab people of Palestine. What kind of peace is that if more than three
million people who have the inalienable right to have a roof over their heads, to
have their own even a small state, are deprived of that right. This fact alone shows
how shaky is the ground on which the separate agreement between Israel and
Egypt being imposed by the United States is built.48
Brezhnev’s warning, like the expansionist assertions of Israeli leaders, would continue
to resonate during the opening round of the autonomy negotiations, which followed
two months after the treaty’s signing.
The First Round
Egyptian and Israeli delegations met in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba on Friday
afternoon, May 25, 1979, for the first round of autonomy talks.49 Early that morning,
the Israeli army evacuated the northern Sinai town of El-Arish in coordination
with the Egyptian army, completing an agreement to begin negotiations one month
after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty.50 Dr. Joseph Burg, Israel’s minister of interior, and General Kamal Hassan Ali,
the Egyptian defense minister, led their respective delegations in the talks, held at Ben
Gurion University. U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance and Carter’s special envoy to
the Middle East, Robert Strauss, headed the American delegation.
Strauss, who had been chairman of the Democratic National Committee and
successfully completed the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations as U.S.
trade representative, was a political figure deeply sympathetic to Israel.51 According to
an internal Israeli memo, Strauss’s belief in Israel’s conception of its own security
would ensure his loyalty on matters as sensitive as the fate of Jerusalem. “He is the
man who will go to the President [Carter] close the door behind him and say the city
will not be divided into two, and we must find an acceptable solution to the problem.
He will do this, of course, after he hears and discusses Israel’s position and feeling on
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the topic.”52 Burg, the leader of Israel’s National Religious Party, was selected in part
to safeguard Begin’s coalition allies, but also as a signal that the prime minister viewed
the autonomy issue as an internal Israeli domestic problem, not a matter for the
Foreign Ministry to deal with.53
Speaking on behalf of Egyptian prime minister Mustafa Khalil, who was unable
to attend, General Ali opened the meeting. He invoked President Sadat, who “has
emphasized repeatedly that the Palestinian problem is the heart and crux of the entire
conflict.” Ali articulated guidelines to underpin the talks, emphasizing the need for
Palestinian participation in determining their own future. “Only the Palestinians
themselves can make such a decision, for self-determination is their God-given right.
Our task is merely to define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing
authority with full autonomy and the modalities for electing it.”54 In a method parallel
to the Israeli use of autonomy, the Egyptians thereby deployed a sacralized yet abstract
concept of self-determination, as distinguished from procedural, yet politically decisive
responsibilities, as a means to defer direct engagement with the Palestinians.55 This
tactic served their immediate agenda as benevolent protectors of Palestinian rights,
even as Sadat had all but cast the Palestinians aside in signing a bilateral treaty with
Israel.
Despite occasional clashes, Egyptian acquiescence to the narrow Israeli and
American positions on Palestinian autonomy continued throughout the duration of
the negotiations. For instance, during a subsequent round of talks held at Alexandria’s
San Stefano Hotel, Egyptian prime minister Mustafa Khalil got into a disagreement
with his Israeli interlocutors over the mechanisms for implementing autonomy on the
ground. Egypt believed that any Self-Governing Authority established in the
Occupied Territories should have legislative, executive, and judicial powers, while the
Israeli position was limited to budgetary and regulatory powers. The Israelis also
insisted on inserting language that emphasized autonomy was only for the inhabitants
of the West Bank and Gaza “and not to territory.” Khalil knew this was a ruse to strip
autonomy of all meaning, arguing that in the Camp David Accords “it was never
mentioned that it [will] apply to inhabitants and not territory.” Yet despite his reserva-
tions, Khalil acceded to the Israeli interpretation of Camp David, particularly on the
question of Palestinian statehood. “We have to be careful in our phrases,” Khalil
remarked to Burg. “I cannot come and say powers and responsibilities that could lead
to forming an independent Palestinian state.” Burg quickly replied, “On this I would
go along with you. This is the point.” It was a clear indication that even for Egypt,
the outcome of the autonomy talks cohered with Israeli and American priorities to
avoid the possible emergence of a Palestinian state.56
For the PLO leadership, following the talks from a distance in Lebanon, the impli-
cations of autonomy were distressingly clear. Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO,
conveyed his views to the United States government via a secret back channel.57 Arafat,
seeking global recognition of the Palestinian plight, recognized that the PLO had to
shift from armed resistance to a negotiated settlement. But he described the Camp
David Accords as nothing more than “meaningless negotiations about some
permanent colonial status for the Palestinians under Israeli rule.” The PLO leader
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warned of the “massive build-up of U.S. arms to both Israel and Egypt, and prepara-
tions of another Arab-Israeli war which Begin is doing everything to provoke though
his attacks on South Lebanon. That is not a treaty for peace—it is a treaty for war.”58
Arafat was equally dismissive of autonomy, which he called “a farce,” instead
suggesting an alternative path. “If there is a clear platform for serious, comprehensive
peace negotiations,” Arafat remarked to U.S. officials, “we will of course take part.”
In Arafat’s view, that platform should include three major points.
1) Human rights for the Palestinians;
2) The principle of the right of return for the Palestinians;
3) The right of the Palestinians to have our own state.59
In the wider context of an emerging discourse on human rights in the 1970s, the PLO
demands echoed similar political struggles across the globe. For more than a decade,
Arafat upheld these demands, eventually securing the PLO’s return to the West Bank
and Gaza Strip with the signing of the Oslo Accords. But this eventual acceptance of
limited self-rule through the establishment of the Palestinian Authority diluted the
central elements of the Palestinian national struggle, bumping up against the ceiling
of autonomy first laid out by Begin in 1977.60
The absence of Palestinian participation in the autonomy meetings, which
continued until their conclusion in 1982, was noted from the inception.61 U.S.
diplomats, despite their continuing public pronouncements on the importance of
Palestinian economic and political rights, in fact privately supported Palestinian
exclusion from the negotiations.62 And as vacuous as the Egyptian and American
endorsements of Palestinian self-determination may have been, they were still met
with an overwhelmingly negative Israeli response. In his opening speech, Burg
remarked that at the heart of autonomy “lies the conviction that the Palestinian Arabs
should and must conduct their own daily lives for themselves and by themselves.” But
he stressed a conceptual distinction. “What I must make clear and what must be
understood from the outset is that autonomy does not and cannot imply sovereignty
. . . we must, by definition, reject a-priori an independent Palestinian statehood. Israel
will never agree, and indeed, totally rejects the propositions, declarations or estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.”63 Israel’s
overarching priority, as successive rounds made clear, was to keep the talks in motion
and embed a hegemonic definition of autonomy without enabling Palestinian sover-
eignty or statehood.
Burg’s position throughout the talks rested on a dramatic narrative of Israel’s
security needs. “No hostile element or agent or force dare control the heartland of this
land to threaten the lives of its city dwellers and villagers and thereby hold a knife to
the jugular vein of Israel.”64 In Israeli diplomatic parlance, Palestinians often denoted
the PLO, and as Begin himself would tell Strauss, “The PLO is beyond the pale of
human civilization.”65 Until the conclusion of the negotiations, then, no Palestinians
would participate in a discussion about their own future, nor would a joint Jordanian
delegation that might mitigate concerns about PLO involvement. A confidant of Burg
at the time, the American Jewish leader Henry Siegman, later recalled discussions
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during which the Israeli minister of interior admitted that the mere existence of the
talks was a mechanism for “shooting the dog” of Palestinian autonomy.66
Autonomy into the 1980s
Domestic considerations in the United States coupled with several crises abroad,
including the onset of the Iranian revolution, precipitated Carter’s disengagement
from the autonomy talks by the end of 1979. Ambassador Sol Linowitz, the lead U.S.
negotiator who had replaced Ambassador Strauss, worked diligently to reconcile the
central divisions between Egypt and Israel in a bid to achieve some tangible results for
the Palestinians although he too precluded statehood.67 During a meeting in Cairo in
January 1980, the Egyptian and Israeli delegations presented Linowitz with varying
models of autonomy to break the deadlock over the permissible degree of Palestinian
self-rule. Israel’s model was entirely functional—the establishment of what was called
a “Self Governing Authority (Administrative Council)” for Palestinians to deal with
shared issues, while residual sovereignty remained with Israel. This functionalism
reflected a persistent employment of autonomy as a political and discursive tool to
diminish the possibility of sovereignty. Egypt’s autonomy model, however, was based
on the mode of civil administration used by the Israeli military government and was
intended to provide Palestinians with actual power for self-rule, in the form of
exclusive authority over land and inhabitants. Conceptually, the Egyptian model was
akin to a mandate for the development of an eventual independent state after an
interim waiting period.68
Linowitz selected the Israeli model as the basis for continuing negotiations, and
the Egyptians reluctantly agreed.69 Secret documents reveal prior meetings between
the United States and Israeli delegations to prepare and adopt the Israeli position
paper, with U.S. ambassador James Leonard telling Israeli representatives “We will ask
you, and even suggest to you, some formulations in conformity with what you gave
to us.”70 Egypt’s acquiescence reflected Sadat’s underlying personal trust in the United
States’ ability to extract concessions from Israel during the course of the negotiations.
Leading members of Sadat’s delegation at Camp David had, however, attacked this
confidence. Egypt’s foreign minister, Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, warned Sadat
about the autonomy provisions of Camp David just before resigning in protest. “We
are only deceiving ourselves if we say this project will end in the realization of a just
solution to the Palestinian cause, for Israel will use it as an instrument and a source of
support to liquidate the issue in accordance with its expansionist intentions.”71
While Kamel’s warnings evoked the skepticism of other critics like Brezhnev, Sadat
was primarily concerned with achieving a peace deal with Israel and with securing
U.S. backing for internal reforms in his country. He believed Egypt in the post-Nasser
era was “encumbered with worries and problems,” and that its public utilities were
“in a state of collapse.”72 These domestic concerns fueled Egypt’s turn away from
Soviet patronage in the wake of the 1973 War and culminated in Sadat’s decision to
pursue a bilateral agreement with Israel.73 But the Egyptian president also became
increasingly vocal about Begin’s intransigent stance toward implementing Camp
David. In conversations with Carter during the summer of 1980, Sadat demanded that
the Israeli prime minister agree that “Jerusalem is negotiable, stop the settlements, and
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take care of the human rights of the Palestinians.” Recording this conversation in his
diary, Carted noted: “I don’t believe he [Begin] will do any of these things, and has
dug himself a hole very damaging to Israel.”74
This tense diplomatic environment and Sadat’s domestic preoccupations
contributed to a feeble Egyptian stance in the negotiations. In a further indication of
the increasingly asymmetrical nature of the autonomy talks, the Egyptians were often
excluded from key meetings between the Israeli and American delegations. Records of
these bilateral meetings highlight a pattern by which Palestinian concerns were
rendered subsidiary to Israeli priorities. Among these priorities was ensuring that nego-
tiations over possible Palestinian autonomy did not undermine the physical expansion
of settlements in the Occupied Territories.
One example of what this linkage enabled can be found in the minutes of a
meeting between U.S. ambassador Linowitz and the full Israeli delegation in Jerusalem
on September 2, 1980. Turning to the rapid expansion of Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Territories, Linowitz asked Ariel Sharon to explain the status of settlement
development and the rationale of expansion in light of their sensitive role in the
autonomy talks. “We are finishing the skeleton,” Sharon answered, anticipating the
announcement of four further settlements. In one of the clearest expressions of what
these settlements were intended to achieve, Sharon then outlined his aims:
You have to take into consideration, and again I am saying why I believe we have
to hurry, why I believe that we have to finish it before the coming elections in
Israel: the facts that were created in the areas, the skeleton, the map that exists
practically in the area now does not allow any more and will not enable in the
future any territorial compromise. I don’t see any possibility of territorial
compromise. There are many possibilities of political answers or, let’s say modifi-
cations, but I cannot see any territorial compromise. I don’t see now any area that
can be handed to anybody having this skeleton practically in the area.75
The “skeleton” Sharon helped design and implement on occupied Palestinian land
was a means to ensure none of the land could ever be ceded to the Arab inhabitants.
This framework of the settlement project, and its deployment as a prerequisite even
for diplomatic discussion of autonomy, was explicitly meant to prevent any cession of
territory by Israel, or the creation of a Palestinian state, interlinked objectives that
have been achieved and maintained up to the present day.
The Israeli government had already accelerated plans for this expansion at the time
of the Camp David summit. Not long after Begin returned from the cloistered
thirteen days in rural Maryland with Sadat and Carter, the director general of his
office, Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, gathered a secret committee of high-level Israeli officials
to devise a position on the future of the Occupied Territories.76 Fearful as they were
of Camp David’s implications, Ben-Elissar’s committee swiftly completed their task
in just three months, agreeing on a basic outline for any peace talks related to the
Palestinian question. This included the territorial retention of 250,000 acres of “state
land” in the West Bank, continued control of underground water resources, and
special jurisdiction for Jewish settlers in the territories.77 The specter of the public
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autonomy negotiations had in fact triggered a new round of internal Israeli decision-
making intended to strengthen the Israeli government’s hold on the land beyond the
Green Line.78 This dialectic—working internationally to deploy autonomy as a means
of dealing politically with Palestinians on the one hand, and locally developing settle-
ments to extend Israeli territorial sovereignty on the other—clearly illustrates the
mechanics of a transformative occupation at work. Sharon’s affirmation to Linowitz
in the autonomy meeting of September 1980 was merely the instantiation of this
process within the Unites States–Israel bilateral discussion.
American diplomats were fully aware of the consequences. As Linowitz later wrote
in his memoir, “Palestinian autonomy would have little meaning if Israel could contin-
uously redefine its security needs with reference to the land supposedly under the self-
governing Palestinian authority.”79 Like Israel’s “decision not to decide” on the fate of
the territories after the 1967 War and the suggestion of a time-limited period in which
to implement autonomy, the recurring rounds of negotiations, structured by the
blurred concepts of Israeli security and Palestinian autonomy, served as a floating
mechanism to defer clear decision making on legal rights, national sovereignty, or
final state borders. Despite misgivings, minutes of the autonomy meetings in which
Linowitz participated clearly demonstrate that when confronted with Israeli actions,
the leading U.S. diplomat was unable to halt or reverse expansion in any meaningful
way.
Succumbing to foreign policy missteps and economic troubles at home, Carter
lost the 1980 presidential election to former California governor Ronald Reagan. In a
final report on the state of the autonomy talks, Linowitz assessed the prospects of their
success in a new administration. He told Carter that much had been achieved in the
successive rounds of negotiations, aside from five core issues: “1) Source of power; 2)
Water and land rights; 3) Jewish settlements; 4) Security; and 5) East Jerusalem.”80
Given the effort that had been expended in dozens of meetings, this extensive list
underscored the effectiveness of Israeli tactics in negotiating autonomy along such
narrow lines. There was a slim possibility that these issues would be tackled anew
amid the shifting ideological priorities of the Reagan White House.
Carter, who had sacrificed a great deal of political capital by offering limited
support for some form of Palestinian self-rule during his tenure, was bitterly disap-
pointed with the failure of the autonomy talks. During his final meeting with Israel’s
ambassador to the United States, Ephraim Evron, the outgoing president lamented
the state of affairs. “I don’t see how they [Israel] can continue as an occupying power
depriving the Palestinians of basic human rights, and I don’t see how they can absorb
three million more Arabs into Israel without letting the Jews become a minority in
their own country. Begin showed courage in giving up the Sinai. He did it to keep
the West Bank.”81 It was a clear-eyed assessment, borne out by the rhetoric and policies
of the Israeli government throughout the negotiations, both of which had been
condoned by the acquiescent mediation of Carter’s own administration.
Whatever hope there had been at Camp David for the just adjudication of Pales-
tinian concerns evaporated with the arrival of the new administration in Washington.
Reagan and his advisors returned to the Cold War rhetoric of earlier decades, situating
the Middle East as an arena of Soviet influence. Palestinians, viewed with great
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suspicion and often with outright hostility by conservative critics of the Camp David
process, were painted as Soviet proxies undeserving of self-determination.82 The
United States’ alliance with Israel, however, was deemed strategically important for
the first time, and settlements were no longer viewed as illegal.
Alexander Haig, the new secretary of state, was a leading proponent of these views,
which shaped his approach to the remaining meetings of the autonomy negotiations.
Personally chairing the last meeting of the negotiators in Jerusalem on January 28,
1982, Haig remained silent as Ariel Sharon laid out his settlement expansion plans in
the West Bank. Prime Minister Begin gloated that he had withstood Carter’s admoni-
tions on the question of settlement legality: “Mr. Ronald Reagan put an end to that
debate. He said, the settlements are not illegal. A double negative gives a positive
result. In other words, they are legal or legitimate.”83 Haig sat quietly throughout
Begin’s remarks.
Such tacit agreement with Israel’s semantic and legal shift on the status of the
Occupied Territories was manifest in the administration’s blind eye toward settlement
expansion. Five thousand Jewish settlers lived in the West Bank when Begin entered
office in 1977, and over eighty thousand by the late 1980s. In the interim, commuter
towns and bypass roads for settlers bisected the actual ground upon which Palestinian
sovereignty could ever be achieved. By several accounts, the consolidation of this
matrix of Israeli control would prove irreversible.84 Coupled with the diplomatic and
political promotion of a narrowly functionalist and nonterritorial definition of
autonomy, the ongoing land appropriation and settlement expansion served to
undercut any basis for possible Palestinian statehood.
Conclusion
The 1979–82 autonomy negotiations reveal a great deal about the nature of Israel’s
expansion beyond the 1967 borders, and the diplomacy that sustained it. The very
idiom in which these talks were rooted—autonomy not sovereignty, limited self-
rule—exacerbated political realities on the ground and dismantled the political mecha-
nisms for a just resolution to the Palestinian question. Like the notion of self-
determination that featured in the mandate system after World War I, autonomy for
the local inhabitants of the Occupied Territories was diluted to a point where it
signaled indefinite Israeli control rather than a means to eventual self-government. In
large measure, the blueprint for the limited degree of Palestinian sovereignty that
might ever be reached in a negotiated settlement was first sketched out by Begin,
Burg, Sharon, and members of the Israeli negotiating team, as well as through the
acquiescence of U.S. and Egyptian diplomats working alongside them.
In this manner, the autonomy negotiations offer insight into the workings of a
transformative and durable postwar occupation regime in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, one that denies Palestinians sovereignty while upholding the rights of Jewish
settlers in the same geographic space. While visible evidence of this occupation is well
documented, the evolution of its intellectual, legal, and political framework is only
recently coming under sustained scrutiny.85 In recovering the history of the autonomy
talks, the rationale and political-conceptual dynamics animating Israel’s treatment of
Palestinians in the territories become clearer, as does the tacit, and often explicit,
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acceptance and encouragement of this behavior by other actors. By emphasizing indi-
vidual rights and deterritorialized autonomy, rather than allowing for collective self-
determination after Camp David, the Israeli government and their compliant U.S.
and Egyptian counterparts helped solidify a non-national, nonstatist arrangement for
Palestinians. Echoing the colonial construction of mandatory rule as a purportedly
time-limited stage of communal development, the Camp David–era politics of
autonomy and its attendant five-year implementation window served to defer the
Palestinian national question indefinitely by positing the occupied population as
unsuitable for self-rule.86
Alongside renewed attention to the conjoined moment of Israeli state formation
and the onset of the Palestinian nakba, or catastrophe of 1948, a focus on the post-
1967 occupation era fortifies the link between Israeli territorial expansion and the
ongoing condition of Palestinian statelessness.87 Deployed as a tool to manage an
increasingly restive local population, autonomy was promoted in tandem with an
expansionist practice of settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
These practices transformed the physical landscape of the territories in the late 1970s
and 1980s. Well before the onset of the peace process in the 1990s, the possibility of
political sovereignty for Israel’s occupied population had already been truncated. By
examining the genesis of autonomy in the early stages of these negotiations, I am
therefore suggesting we rethink the conventional periodization of the peace process to
account for these prior decades. There is a direct line between the autonomy talks,
presented as the first serious attempt to address the post-1948 Palestinian question on
an international stage, and the post-Oslo reality that has become entrenched in their
wake.
The eventual collapse of the autonomy talks in 1982 during the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon marked the continuation of a political process of state prevention with the
military goal of destroying the PLO. By removing the Palestinian question from
serious diplomatic consideration from Camp David through the late 1980s, Israeli
leaders were able to draw on alternative strategies for dealing with the Arab inhabitants
of the Occupied Territories within a non-national context.88 Certainly, the pace of the
PLO’s internal evolution from armed struggle toward political negotiation affected
their international standing as well. After the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987,
when the Palestinian struggle for self-determination reached a wide global audience,
Reagan was compelled to open an official dialogue with the PLO.89 This rapid shift
was accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the United States–led coalition victory
in the First Gulf War, after which President George H.W. Bush initiated multilateral
negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict at the 1991 Madrid Conference. It was
the first time that Palestinians were included in substantive discussions over their
political fate. Along with the Oslo Accords of 1993, this nascent peace process was
viewed as a viable mechanism to address Palestinian self-determination and Israeli
national aspirations in the same frame.90
Throughout all of these efforts, the imprint of the autonomy talks remained. Oslo,
with its focus on limited self-rule for Palestinians, reproduced the narrow conception
of autonomy advanced by Israel during negotiations more than a decade earlier.
Begin’s autonomy plan, as both records from his time in office and later discussions
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make clear, became the basis for the U.S. and Israeli negotiating positions—and the
birth of the Palestinian Authority—in the years that followed.91 Among Palestinian
negotiators at the Madrid Conference, there was deep suspicion of American attempts
to revive this model. Many of those same negotiators felt betrayed by Yasser Arafat’s
subsequent acceptance of the Oslo Accords, which reified the notion of limited self-
rule and mirrored Begin’s original ideas presented in 1977.92 The logic of Oslo, which
maintained Israeli control over Palestinian movements in key areas of the territories
while respecting the autonomy of individual enclaves, bred a condition that Eyal
Weizmann has incisively called “prosthetic sovereignty.”93 This condition has engen-
dered official opposition to the notion of a fully sovereign Palestinian state, even as
Israeli leaders have claimed to embrace a “two-state solution” to ending the conflict.94
Looking back on autonomy from the contemporary vantage point of a fractured
Palestinian polity, we can more clearly discern how the historical absence and active
prevention of sovereignty endures as a primary obstacle to Palestinian self-
determination. The failure of the peace process underscores the devastating twin
impact of, on the one hand, prolonged political disenfranchisement through the devel-
opment of flexible political concepts, such as autonomy, that marginalize sovereignty
claims and, on the other hand, the physical encroachment of settlements on the
ground, which blur political boundaries via a mechanism of “de facto annexation.”95
Autonomy’s purchase helps explain how and why Palestinian statelessness was perpet-
uated in the wake of Camp David, and may go some distance in explaining why
meaningful Palestinian statehood remains elusive today.
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